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Abstract
This note is a discussion of the paper “Confidence distribution” by
Min-ge Xie and Kesar Singh, to appear in the International Statistical
Review.
“We have shown how confidence distributions, as a broad concept,
can subsume and be associated to many well-known notions in statis-
tics across different schools of inference.” M. Xie and K. Singh
I must first acknowledge I am rather baffled about the overall reason of this
review and that this bafflement will necessarily impact the following discussion.
Indeed, and this is not truly a coincidence!, I happen (and so do the authors of
the review) to have discussed the related paper by Fraser (2011) a few months
ago: while I strongly disagreed on the conclusions of this paper, the central
point made by Don Fraser was quite clear, namely to show that Bayesian pos-
terior statements were ungrounded. The current paper is mostly missing this
type of clear message and it does not convey a true sense of support for using
confidence distributions. I find instead that the paper meanders rather aimlessly
around the definition of confidence distributions, which are in short dual repre-
sentations of frequentist confidence sets, and that it never reaches any definitive
conclusion about the appeal of relying on those confidence distributions... For
instance, I had to wait till Section 4 to be introduced to inference based on con-
fidence distributions and I find the description anticlimactic: using confidence
distributions to
– construct confidence intervals is hardly surprising, since this is how those
distributions are constructed;
– derive point estimators does not show any advance beyond convergence in
probability;
∗In memoriam: Between the time I met for the first time with Prof. Singh in Rutgers
in early April 2012 and the time I wrote this review, Prof. Singh most sadly passed away.
Although I did not know him well, I think he would have appreciated the intellectual challenge
raised in this intellectual dispute and responded accordingly. I am quite sorry this opportunity
will never occur.
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– conduct testing of hypotheses simply provides a recovery of the usual
p-value both in the one-sided and two-sided cases, and again is hardly
surprising given the duality between tests and confidence procedures.
Similarly, optimality is defined as to mirror UMPU test optimality (Lehmann,
1986). The most fruitful connection witness applications of confidence distri-
butions appear later in Section 7, in particular with the reinterpretation of
bootstrap (Section 7.3), although I am far from convinced that “the concept of
confidence distribution is much broader” than the one of bootstrap distribution.
Furthermore, the very concept of confidence distributions is restricted (at least
in the paper) to unidimensional entities, and seems to possess as many avatars
as there are ways of constructing confidence intervals. So, by the end of this
long review, I do remain skeptical about the innovation (for frequentist theory)
brought by adopting the perspective of confidence distributions.
“Clearly a confidence distribution does not have to be a Bayes pos-
terior distribution, as there are numerous ways to derive it.” M. Xie
and K. Singh
The fundamental difficulty I have with confidence distributions is the same
I have with fiducial distributions, namely one of missing a proper target. Some
objective Bayes approaches like matching priors (see, e.g., Robert, 2001) are of-
ten criticised for having as sole purpose to mimic a frequentist coverage, hence
questioning the relevance of going the Bayesian way. It seems to me that this
methodology of confidence distributions suffers from the same if reverse draw-
back: as with Fisher’s fiducial distributions, one tries to produce a posterior
distribution without following a Bayesian modelling approach, i.e. without se-
lecting a reference prior distribution, hence questioning the relevance of not
going the Bayesian way! As a result, either the constructed confidence distribu-
tion corresponds to a valid Bayesian posterior distribution, in which case it is
highly preferable to conduct the choice and assessment of this prior on a prelim-
inary and open basis (rather than defaulting to an implicit black-box prior). Or
the confidence distribution does not correspond to a genuine prior distribution,
in which case it is then incoherent in terms of mere probability theory, thus
likely to suffer the same woes as most empirical Bayes approaches (like ineffi-
ciency and over-fitting). Things somehow turn for the worse when the authors
consider a “true” prior distribution pi(θ), which may be a confidence distribution
resulting from past experiments, and combine it with the confidence distribu-
tion associated with the current data, shying away from the genuine likelihood:
if nothing else, multiplying two densities of the same random variable together
is an impossibility from a probabilistic perspective.
The object of a confidence distribution does thus remain a full mystery for
me, as I do not see how to use it with any confidence either as a Bayesian
procedure or as a frequentist procedure. In the former perspective, it does not
necessarily correspond to a prior distribution and to perceive the confidence
distribution as a way “to assist the development of objective Bayes approaches”
is misguided, in that the corresponding “priors” (if any) would then be data-
dependent, hence loose the basic coherence of the Bayesian approach. In the
latter perspective, having a probability distribution on a fixed parameter θ does
not make sense. Except when reinterpreting it as a bootstrap distribution,
i.e. with a randomness endowed by the observation into θˆ rather than from the
2
parameter. I must add that the authors of the review do not indicate that the
methodology has met with widespread use, beyond their own circle.
In Section 6.2, the fact that expert opinion is available to build prior distri-
butions would sound to me as the most natural way to engage into licit Bayesian
activities since the construction of this prior is then validated by the real world.
To replace the exact likelihood with a confidence distribution is a way to shoot
oneself in the foot, by throwing away a coherent and valid scheme for another
one wasting some of the information provided by the data (and contradicting
Birnbaum’s likelihood principle in addition!).
“The result is a mathematical coincidence, hinged on the normal
assumption.” M. Xie and K. Singh
The authors seem to consider that having genuine posterior distributions
turn into exact confidence distributions cannot have a deeper explanation than
being a freak, i.e. “a mathematical coincidence”. While being a spectator for
this kind of exercise, I would think there are deeper reasons for this agreement,
first and foremost in connection with the Bayesian interpretation of the best
unbiased estimator of Pitman (1938). Furthermore, the work of Welch and
Peers (1963) shows that prior distributions can be chosen towards an agreement
with the frequentist coverage.
“We can have multiple confidence distributions for the same param-
eter under any specific setting.”M. Xie and K. Singh
As acknowledged by the authors, the notion of confidence distributions suf-
fers from the same taint of ad-hocquery as most frequentist (and empirical Bayes,
see Robert, 2001) procedures, namely that the confidence distribution can be
defined in many ways. Section 5 introduces an ordering of those confidence
distributions but it unfortunately is an incomplete ordering, as most frequentist
orderings are, and it is thus unlikely that two arbitrary solutions can be ordered
according to this principle. The strong connection with UMPU tests—whose
own optimality proceeds from an unnatural restriction on testing procedures—
reflects this difficulty.
“A counterintuitive ‘outlying posterior phenomenon’ that is inherent
in a Bayesian approach can be avoided in a confidence distribution-
based approach.” M. Xie and K. Singh
The counter-example discussed in Section 6.2 is only relevant in uncovering
the approximation due to the confidence distribution-based approach, rather
than pointing out an inherent flaw in the Bayesian approach. Indeed, the fact
that the posterior distribution is concentrated away from both the prior and
the posterior concentrations seems to be (as far as I can infer given the sparse
description contained in the paper) due to the use of a profile likelihood, which
is an imprecise notion throwing away some of the information contained in
the data. When checking on a regular Bayesian analysis of this beta-binomial
model, I could not spot any discrepancy, using either independent (Fig. 1) or
dependent (Fig. 2) priors. In any case, the more global issue of having partial
prior information like marginal priors on proportions p0 and p1 does not seem
to be such “a challenging question for Bayesian analysis”. Indeed, given those
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Figure 1: Contour plots for the prior
(light brown), likelihood (red), and pos-
terior (blue) on (p1, p2) based on 100
binomial observations xi ∼ B(100, pi)
with x1 = 35 and x2 = 67 and an
independent prior, p1 ∼ Be(2, 3) and
p2 ∼ Be(3, 4).
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Figure 2: Same legend as Figure 1
when using a dependent prior with p1 ∼
Be(2, 3) and p2|p1 ∼ N (p1, 0.1) re-
stricted to (0, 1).
two marginals, it is always possible to select one parameterised family of copula
distributions and to estimate the parameters of this copula as part of a global
Bayesian analysis (Silva and Lopes, 2008).
“The review is not intended to re-open the philosophical debate that
has lasted more than two hundred years. On the contrary, it is hoped
that the article will help bridge the gap between these different sta-
tistical procedures.” M. Xie and K. Singh
In conclusion, I fear the authors have not made a proper case in favour of con-
fidence distributions. The notion carries neither consistency nor optimality fea-
tures of its own, while it fundamentally relies on the choice of another frequentist
confidence or p-value procedure. Worse, the very construction of the confidence
distribution as an inversion of the confidence interval, i.e. Hn(·) = τ−1n (·), repro-
duces the common and mislead semantic drift from “(−∞, τn(α) contains the
true value θ0 with probability α” to “θ0 belongs to the fixed interval (−∞, τn(α)
with probability α”. Further, as reflected by the discussion at the end of Section
6, the review reflects deep misunderstandings about Bayesian inference. Indeed,
speaking of a “truthful joint prior” or of a “prior that is in agreement with the
likelihood evidence” shows that the prior is considered as a mythical (if true)
unique entity, rather than as the choice of a reference measure, which is how I
do understand priors.
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